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ABSTRACT
We consider the differential incentives of the North and the South to
providepatent protection to innovating firms in the North. The two regions
are assumed to have a different distribution of preferences over the range of
exploitable technologies. Due to the scarcity of R&D resources, the two
regions are in potential competition with each other to encourage the
development of technologies most suited to their needs. This provides a
motive for the South to provide patent protection even when it constitutes a
small share of the world market and hence has strong free riding incentives
otherwise. A benevolent global planner will set equal rates of patent
protection only when it weights the welfare of the two regions equally. We
find that the comparative statics of the Nash equilibrium exhibit considerable
ambiguity. Numerical simulations in the benchmark case yield the following
results: (i) when the technological preferences of the two countries become
more similar, the level of patent protection provided by the South is reduced;
(ii) when the relative market size of the South is increased, the South
enhances its patent protection. In both cases, the level of Northern patents
is relatively insensitive.
Ishac Diwan Dani Rodrik
IECDI Kennedy School
The World Bank Harvard University
1818 H Street, N.W. 79 Kennedy Street
Washington, DC 20433 Cambridge, MA 02138PATENTS, APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY,AND NORTH-SOUTHTRADE
I.Introduction
One of the contentious North-South issues under discussion in the current
round of GATT negotiations concerns the protection of intellectual property
rights (IPR5). The U.S., European Community, and Japan are in broad agreement
that the international trading system provides inadequate protection to IPRs,
and have put forth a number of proposals to tighten restrictions; poorer
countries, whose practices would be most immediately affected, oppose these
proposals on the grounds that they would increase the profits of monopolistic
foreign firms at the expense of domestic consumers.
Under the present regime, IPRs are largely beyond the scope of the GATT, -
andfall under the jurisdiction of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), a U.N. agency. It is WIPO that oversees the existing
international agreements on IPRs such as the Paris Convention (on patents) and
the Berne Convention (on copyrights). The Paris Convention requires member
states, under the national treatment principle, to apply identical criteria to
foreign and domestic firms, but does not prescribe specific levels of patent
protection. Most of the ninety-eight members of the Convention are in fact
developing countries. But the developed countries argue that the prevailing
practices in the South leave much to be desired. Among complaints voiced by
the former are: selective sectoral coverage in national legislation;
inadequate remedies and sanctions in case of infringement of IPRs; procedural
and administrative difficulties impeding access to courts; and arbitrariness
and discrimination in the application of domestic statutes. Developing
countries like Brazil and India in turn stress the possible exacerbation of
monopolistic practices by Northern firms if patent protection were to become
more stringent. Therefore, they resist GATT involvement in IPRs, and prefer
to use WIPO, which lacks enforcement power, as the forum for discussion of-2-
such issues.1
The basic economic issue that underlies the conflict of interest is easy
to see.2 Most patented products or processes that make it to Southern markets
are developed in the North. The North would therefore profit from tighter
patent procedures in the South, as this would protect Northern firms against
imitators in their export markets. According to the U.S. International Trade
Commission, U.S. firms lose around $8 billion annually from patent and
copyright infringements (cited in Baldwin, 1988). But by the same token, the
South would like to pay as little as possible for these innovations, which is
what lax patent protection achieves. To be sure, this in turn reduces the
incentives of Northern firms to invest in R&D. As long as the South is a
small part of the world market, however, the adverse effects of its policies
on global innovative activity are also small, and free riding on the North
makes eminently good sense. As a recent paper by Chin and Grossman (1988)
demonstrates, it may be in the South's interest to provide no patent
protection whatsoever.
In this paper we analyze this conflict of interest by bringing into
consideration another feature of some importance. This new feature consists
of the possibility that the North and South may have differing technological
needs: the North would like to develop drugs against cancer and heart disease,
whereas the South benefits more from drugs against tropical diseases; labor is
cheap in the South but expensive in the North, so the North's labor-saving
innovations are less useful in the South. When R&D resources that can be
1. This discussion is drawn from various GATT sources. See also Baldwin
(1988), Benko (1988), Hamilton and Whalley (1988), pp. 28-29, and Kelly et al.
(1988), p. 39.
2. For an early statement of the issues, see Penrose (1951), especially
chaps. VII and X.-3-
deployed in support of these innovations are limited, choices have to be made
as to which areas will receive greater emphasis. Now Southern patents may
have a role to play in promoting the development of technologies appropriate
to the South that would not have been developed in the absence of these
patents.3 This incentive now competes against the free-riding motive. As we
shall see, one implication is that a benevolent global planner who puts a
greater weight on the South's welfare than on the North's would no longer
necessarily prefer lower patent protection in the South. Another implication
of the potential competition for suitable technologies is that increased
patent protection in the South need not always be good for the North.
The only other formal model devoted to IPRs in the North-South context
that we are aware of is the one by Chin and Crossman (1988). These authors
consider the competition between two firms, one each form the North and South.
The Northern firm can invest in process innovation, which the Southern firm
can copy costlessly when the South provides no patent protection. Our
framework differs from theirs in a number of respects. We allow for a
continuum of potential technologies, with a different distribution of
preferences over them in the two regions. This framework can be interpreted
in terms of product, as well as process, innovation. Second, our model has
free entry into the R&D sector, rather than duopolistic competition between
two firms. Third, we allow gradations of patent protection, which is more
3. This point was recognized early on by Vernon (1957, p. 12): "... thereis
a case to be made that inventors in the industrialized areas of the world may
need some special incentive to concentrate their talents on products of
special utility to the underdeveloped areas." The only empirical study on LDC
patents appears to be the one by Deolalikar and Roller (1989), which analyzes
the relationship between patenting and total factor productivity for Indian
firms.-4-
general than the simple binary choice (protection or no protection) analyzed
by Chin and Grossman. Finally, we assume that the Northern and Southern
markets are segmented, due to differential patent-law application in the two
regions. All of these features appear to be desirable ones. Their cost is
that, unlike Chin and Grossman, we do not get into the details of the
strategic interactions between Northern and Southern firms competing in
oligopolistic markets.
II. Preliminaries
We allow for an unlimited spectrum of potential technologies, indexed by
the continuous variable 9 e (-co,a'). Therange of discovered technologies,
characterized by a lower bound t and an upper bound 6, is endogenous and
denoted by [j, 7] .Welimit the analysis to uninterrupted ranges (i.e. no
"holes" are allowed in the range).
Consumers are differentiated by taste, with each having a preferred
variety of technology.4 Consumers can therefore also be indexed by their
preferred 9. To keep things simple, we assume each consumer gets utility of 1
if his prefered technology is available, and 0 otherwise. Letting u(9) stand




Northern consumers are distributed according to the continuous distribution
4. The use of the term "consumer" here is perfectly general, and applies
equally well to producers who are downstream users of technology. If we
interpret the set of technologies as pertaining to a particular economic
activity, 9 could measure the required capital-labor ratio, the level of
skilled labor needed, the expected life of the equipment, and so forth. Or, 9
could simply index different products.-5-
function B(9) with support (-, Aggregateconsumer welfare in the North
can then be written as a function of the range of discovered technologies:
fo
(2) un(L, )— u(9)B(9)d9—B(9)d9,
J-o J
where we have used (1). For the moment, nothing specific need be assumed
about the shape of B(.). But it will help to think of B(.) as a single-
peaked, symmetric distribution such as the normal.
Consumers in the South are parameterized in same manner, except that we
assume the distribution function for Southern consumers is centered on a mean
to the riht of that of the North. Further, the mass of Southern customers is
a fraction -y of those in North (<l), with y measuring the relative market
share of the two regions. This allows us to write the distribution function
for the South as a simple transformation of that of the North.
B5(9) —-yB(9-5).
Aggregate consumer welfare in the South is then given by
(3) U5(., )— iI B(8-S)d9.
We assume that all innovations take place in the North. This is not
terribly restrictive provided that the North has a sufficiently strong
comparative advantage in research and development or that the South can
appropriately discriminate between domestic and foreign firms in the
application of its patent laws. As both of these are realistic features of
the current regime, we can concentrate on the decisions of Northern firms-6-
alone. We assume that there is an infinite supply of potential innovating
firms, with each existing firm identified by the technology it has developed.
There is a fixed cost c required to develop each technology; marginal costs of
production will not play an interesting role for innovating firms, so we will
ignore them. These fixed costs are treated parametrically by the firms, even
though an expansion of the range [i.,9]tends to drive c up as the costs of
resources used in the innovation process are bid up. So we will write c —
c(9-fl, withc'>O and c''>O. This "congestion" effect acts like an
externality, and will play an important role in the analysis. Its purpose is
to capture the reality that the resources used in R&D are not in perfectly
elastic supply.
Consider the pricing strategy of a firm which has developed and patented
a certain technology. If patent protection were perfect, the firm could
capture the entire consumer surplus by charging a price of unity (technically,
unity minus epsilon). Since patent protection never provides for full
monopoly,5 it is preferable to work with a model in which the firm can capture
only a fraction of consumer surplus and has to charge a price lower than
unity. A simple way to link the patent laws to the pricing behavior of firms
is as follows. Suppose the innovator faces a large fringe of potential
imitators in the North, each of which can mimic the former by incurring unit
coats of a<l and no fixed coats. The parameter a can be thought of in part as
capturing the (expected) unit coats incurred by imitators if they are brought
to court and successfully prosecuted. In this sense, a parameterizes the
restrictiveness of the prevailing patent laws in the North, with higher a
5. In practice, even full patent rights are likely to confer only limited
protection against imitators and fail to internalize R&D spillovers. See
Dasgupta (1988) and .Jaffe (1986).-7-
associated with more complete patent protection. The analogous role in the
South is played by the parameter .Sincethe innovator's marginal Costs are
assumed zero (or, less restrictively, lower than the imitators), he will
always have the incentive to charge the limit-prices a [0, 1) and fi [0, 1)
in the the two regions, respectively.6 Hence the market equilibrium is
similar to that with contestable markets: for each technology in the produced
range, the incumbent firm (the innovator) charges the price which equals the
unit cost of potential entrants. The costs of potential imitators are in turn
determined by the restrictiveness of prevailing patent laws.
Total Northern profits can then be written as:
(4) fl(L 9) —I [aZ(8) + flyB(9-S)Jde
-[9 - 11cC.).
J1
We assume that entry into n technologies, as opposed to already developed
ones, is free. Firms enter until revenues just cover fixed Costs. This





which must hold at the edges of the range (see Figure 1). Provided B(9) is
single-peaked and not truncated, (5) and (6) together determine the range [0,
6. Notice the implication that firms can charge different prices in different
regions. This requires that Southern imitators not be able to market their
output in the North. The justification is that patent restrictions apply to
all sales within a region, irrespective of whether they originate from home or
foreign firms. This is consistent with the Paris Convention. Further, in the
U.S., importation of a product that uses a domestically-patented process is
forbidden.-8-
9] of technologies which firms will find in their interest to develop. We
assume that S or y are small enough to ensure that the range of profitable
technologies is indeed a continuous one. Notice that as long as >O, the
presence of the South allows the North to exploit a wider range of
technologies, as fixed costs can be spread on a larger base. For the same
reason, Northern firms will always market their products in the South, even if
the degree of patent protection there is substantially lower than in their
home market.
Social welfare in the North is the sum of consumer benefits and profits,
and can be stated as a function of the range of discovered technologies:
(7) W'(j, 7)—I[(°)+ fl7B(O-S)]dO-[9-
Jo
The corresponding expression for the South is:
(8) W5(, 7)— I (l-fl)B5(9)d9—ii (l-fl)B(9-S)dO.
ii J.
Note that fl75B(9-S)d9 represents the transfer of profits from the South to the
North and is therefore subtracted from Southern welfare.
III. Comiarative Statics for the Ranae of Technologies
The policy instruments in this model are a and flwhichparameterize the
degree of patent protection provided in the two regions. They affect the
levels of welfare in the North and South through their influence on the range
of innovations, and, in the case of fi,throughthe magnitude of the profit
transfers from the South to the North. We start by analyzing the response of-9-
andto changes in exogenous parameters.
We first note that equations (5) and (6) yield a relationship between
marginal benefits in the two regions:
(9) (B(L) -8(i)]—7(fl/a)[B(9-S)
-B(L-S)J.
The expressions in the square brackets capture the difference between marginal
consumer benefits at the edges of the range for the two regions. Suppose that
the South did not exist (—O), that it did not provide any patent protection
(fl—O), or that its tastes were identical to the North's (S—0). Then (9) would
require equality between B(.) and 8(i). This equates the marginal consumer
benefits (in the North) at each end of the range. When the South enters the
picture, however, this equality need no longer hold; as we shall see, the
range of produced innovations becomes skewed away from Northern tastes and
towards Southern tastes. The larger is the Southern market (y), the taste
differential (S), and the relative level of Southern patent protection (fl/a),
the more pronounced this becomes.
As a final preliminary, a note is warranted regarding the sign of the
partial derivative of the benefit function B(.), as this plays an important
role in the following analysis. With a symmetric, single-peaked distribution
function, B'(9) is positive or negative depending on which side of the mean 9
lies. We will henceforth assume thatand (9-S) will always lie to the
right, and and (L-S) always to the left, of the mean of B(#).7 This ensures
that
8'(9) < 0, B'(O-S) <0,8'() > 0, B'(-S) > 0.
7. This is in fact too restrictive for the results to be discussed below to
hold. A weaker condition will generally suffice.-10-
An interpretation of these conditions in economic terms is that the marginal
benefit from innovations Afl as the range of innovations becomes broader.
They will always hold for a distribution like the normal one, provided S is
not too large.
(i) Effects of Increased Northern Patent Protection. We differentiate
(5)-(6) totally to perform comparative-statics analysis. Let the determinant
of the system be denoted by < 0 (see the appendix). Then the effect of
changes in a on the boundaries of the range of innovations can be determined
as follows:
(10) dL/da(l/A)(-B()[aB'(9) ÷ yB'(7-S)] +[B(L)-B(O)]c')< 0.
(-) (-) (-) (01+)
As discussed above, B'() and B'(J-S) are both neeative. Moreover, we will
see that (B(.) - B()] >0(i.e. the range will be generally skewed to the
right). These ensure that an increase in patent protection in the North will
unambiguously reduce the lower bound, increasing the number of innovations on
the left of the distribution. These are the innovations which are not greatly
valued in the South.
Some ambiguity exists, however, with the upper bound:
(11) dO/da —(l/)(-(9)[aB'(.)+7B'(-S)]+[B(.)- B(O)Jc'),
(-) (-) (+) (Q/÷)
which is Dositive only if [B(e.)-B(9)]c' is not too large. The
interpretation is as follows. If the range of innovations is already too
skewed to the right (i.e. towards Southern tastes) so that [B(9) - B(9)J >>
0,an increase in Northern patent protection may well lead to some of the
innovations that are relatively more suitable to the South to drop out. This-11-
possibility is due to the crowding-out of existing products as the expansion
of the range of innovative activity increases costs incurred by all
incumbents. When this does not happen, an increase in a will generate more
innovation on the upper end of the range as well.
Further, combining expressions (10) and (11), it can be seen that the
overall range of innovations unambiguously expands as a increases:
(12) dO/da -dVda
—(l/A)(B(9)[aB'(.)+ fryB'C-S)1 -B(L)(aB'(J)+ piz'(e-S)])>0.
Therefore, patent protection in the North will increase innovative activity,
but may do so at the expense of some products which are particularly suited to
Southern requirements.
(ii) Effects of Increased Southern Patent Protection. The effects of
patent protection in the South are similar to those discussed above, except
that they get moderated by the parameter .Hence,an increase in fi
unambiguously increases the innovations that are more appropriate to Southern
needs (i.e. those on the right of the distribution):
(13)d8/d —(-y/)(-B(9-S)[aB'(.)+ yB'(L-S)I + [B(L-S) -B(9-S)]c')> 0
The ambiguity now exists with respect to innovations near the lower end of the
range:
(14) dj/d —(i/)(-B(L-S)[aB'(9)+ fl-yB' (9-S)] + [B(.-S) -B(9-S)]c')
which can be positive if the (negative) term [B(-S) -B(-Sflc'is
sufficiently large in absolute value. Notice that (B(FS) -B(7-S)]is the
difference between Southern marginal consumer benefits at the two ends of the
innovation range. The likelihood that increased patent protection in the
South will lead to some of the products favored in the North to drop Out-12-
increases with: (i) the degree to which existing innovations mirror Northern
requirements; (ii) the diffferences in tastes between the two regions; and
(iii) the magnitude of the cost increase as the range broadens.
Once again, irrespective of whether some innovations drop out, the range
itself must broaden:
(15) dO/dfl -dj/d
—(1/d)(B(7-S)[cxB'(O)÷ fryB'(j-S)] -B(L-S)[aB'(l)+ frrB'(7-S)J > 0,
but the presence of the South skews the range to the right relative to the
mean of the B(9) distribution.
(iii) Effects of Chanee in Relative Market Sizes. As far as the range of
innovations is concerned, the relative market-size parameter enters the
model in much the same way that fidoes:an increase in ,justas an increase
in ,raisesthe weight placed by Northern firms on Southern tastes.
Therefore, the comparative-statics results are much the same. The range of
innovations broadens unambiguously (dud1 -dj/dy> 0), and more of the
potential innovations particularly suited to Southern tastes are developed
(dG/d1 > 0). Some of the innovations at the other end may drop out if the
ten fl[B(-S) -B(9-Sflc'is sufficiently negative.
(iv) Effects of Chanee in Tastes. Taste differences between the two
regions are captured here by the parameter S; the larger is 5, the greater the
taste difference. We would expect that as S increases, the range of
innovations becomes progressively more skewed away from Northern tastes. This
is indeed the case, as both the lower and upper bound of the range
unambiguously move to the right (i.e., dUdS > 0 and dl/dS > 0). Further,
one can show that when -yfl<a, we must have dUdS C 1 and dO/dS < 1.





whose sign looks ambiguous at first sight. With a symmetric distribution,
however, more can be said. Remember that the range of innovations EL, ui
will generally be skewed to the right relative to the mean of B(9) (due to the
South's influence). This allows us to gauge the relative slopes along the
distribution as follows: IB'(L)I >IB'()Iand IB'(G-S)I >IB'(L-S)I.
Therefore the first term in the square brackets dominates and the sign of the
expression must be Dositive. An increase in taste differences between the
North and South widens the range of innovations that are developed.
To conclude this section, there is reason to think that there will be
both cooperative and non-cooperative elements in any North-South bargain over
patent protection. To some extent, patent protection in the North and South
are substitutes for each other, as either increases the incentive of Northern
firms to engage in innovative activity. The closer is y to unity, the greater
impact Southern patent protection has on the profitability of Northern
innovation. But Northern and Southern patents are imrerfect substitutes for
each other. Everything else being the same, both regions would prefer to have
the range of innovations be as congruent with their tastes and requirements as
possible. Southern patent protection, for example, not only increases the
range of innovations, but also skews it away from Northern preferences. As we
shall see, this may provide a rationale for the South to provide protection
even when the incentives to free ride on Northern patents are strong.
In the rest of the paper, the comparative-statics results developed here
will play an important role. We draw attention in particular to the
significance of the ambiguity in the signs of dO/do and duds. A sufficient
condition for the reaction curves of the two regions to slope down in a Nash-14-
equilibrium will be that dO/da> 0and dUdfl <0.We will treat this as the
benchmark. But when dJ/da <0and/or dUd$ >0,increased patent protection
in one region leads to the elimination of innovations that are more highly
favored in the other region compared to the those that are being stimulated.
In such circumstances, one or both of the reaction curves can slope up and
much of the conventional wisdom be reversed.
Since nany of the analytical expressions we derive below are of ambiguous
sign, we will fortify our discussion of the channels at work with a set of
numerical simulations. Our simulations assume that consumer preferences in
the North are distributed according to the standard normal distribution, and
that the cost function is given by c(7-) —[exp(i-j)]/2000.In our central
case, S —1.2and y —0.3.That is, Southern tastes are assumed to be
centered 1.2 standard deviations away from the mean of Northern tastes, and
the South is taken to represent a market 30 percent as big as the North.
(These values ensure that the reaction functions are both negatively sloped
around the Nash equilibrium.) We will also refer to an alternative case with
more extreme taste differences, where S —2and y —0.12,in which the
Northern reaction function will be positively sloped.
IV. Welfare Analysis
Suppose a benevolent global dictator were to assign patent rights to the
two regions in accordance with a conventional social welfare function. Would
she impose rates of patent protection?
To begin with, let the global welfare function (W) be written as an







Sincewe have two independent instruments, a and ,tocontrol two targets, j
and 9, we might as well assume that we can exercise direct control over the






Setting (18) and (19) equal to each other yields:
(20) [8(j) -B(7)J/[B(9-S)
-B(j-S)]—
Hencethe smaller is y, the less off-center is the range of innovations
relative to Northern tastes. Putting (20) together with equation (9), we are
left with the equality y —y(fl/a),which requires a —. Therefore,when the
global welfare function is strictly utilitarian, global optimality does indeed
require eauai levels of patent protection in the two regions. Note that this
holds irrespective of the sizes or tastes of the two regions.
The explanation is as follows. Since we are maximizing total benefits in
the North and the South, the relative size of the South, y, also represents
the relative weight we place on its welfare. But firms weight the two regions
according to their relative profitability, which is captured by the ratio
-y(/a). Firm behavior coincides with social optimality only when a
We can say more about the properties of the optimal levels of patent
protection. Substituting for c(.) from (5) and (6), we can rewrite equations-16-
(18) and (19) as follóws:
(18') (1-a)B(O) + (l-fl)yB(#-S) —[l-j]c'
(19') (l-a)B(O) + (1-$)iB(7-S) —[J-LJc'.
When costs are not increasing in the range of innovations (c'—O), the right-
hand side is zero, implying a —— 1.With constant costs, there are no
distortions in the market, and firms should be allowed to capture the entire
consumer surplus. Patent protection is complete. But when congestion effects
are present (c'>O), firms confer a negative externality on each other. Each
additional firm that enters drives up the costs of incumbents, so that if
patent protection were complete, there would be too many firms. In this case,
since the right-hand side of (18') and (19') is positive, social optimality
requires a —fi C1. Patent protection will be incomplete.
This is, of course, a rather different story from that commonly given as
to why governments provide less than full patent protection. The usual
explanation has to do with reducing the monopoly power of fins to which
protection has been granted and enabling innovations to be readily diffused
after a fixed number of years. But, formally, these explanations can be
reconciled with the present framework. We could presume for example that, due
to technological spillovers, the research costs of each firm are a decreasing
function of the quantity of publicly available technology. As a and fi
increase,patents become more restrictive and fewer technologies remain in the
public domain. Therefore, costs of all firms possibly increase.8 This is
8. More specifically, two effects can be identified as a and fiareraised.
The first, which argues in favor of patents, is that more research is
undertaken. The second, which argues against patents, is that less of it
becomes available to all firms and costs are not sufficiently reduced. When
patent protection is nearly complete, a small decrease can have second-order
effects in terms of the first, but first-order effects in terms of the second.-17-
quite similar to the effect that operates in the present model.
Now suppose that the global dictator is egalitarian, and that she values
the poor South's welfare more than the North's. How would this change the
relationship between the optimal a and fi?
Letthe relative weight attached to the South's welfare be denoted ,
with>l. Global welfare can now be written as
(7 17





where • —- (-l)fl).Note that • > 1 as long as fi< 1.Therefore the only
difference with the earlier objective function is that now the gsa benefits
of the South--gross in the sense that profit transfers to the North are not




where—dfl/de> 0 and v —dfl/dL>0(see the appendix). Notice that since
7andLarenow treated directly as policy variables, the two derivatives
and v refer to the implied changes in fineededto bring about the desired
adjustments in the boundaries. (They are derivatives,as a is being
endogenously adjusted as well.) Putting this together with (9) and
simplifying, we get:
(22) fi— a,with
This would call for incomplete patent protection.-18-
(1 —[l+a(l)]1{+(l-)(p+w)fB(9-S)dO[B(7-S) -
(+) (-)(+) (+) (+)
Notice that>l+a(-l),so that the effect of the first term in the curly
brackets (i.e. )isto raise ,8 relative to a. This comes from the desire to
skew the innovation range towards Southern tastes. But as fiincreases,so do
profit transfers to the North, and this effect is captured by the long second
term in the curly brackets, which is negative and subtracts from .Whether1)
on the whole is bigger or smaller than unity cannot be determined a priori.
But the closer are Southern preferences to Northern ones, the greater the
likelihood that 0 will be less than one, and that $willfall short of a.
This can be seen from (22): [B(7-S) -B(j-S)Jbecomes smaller (and hence its
inverse larger) as S goes to zero (see [9J)•9 As Northern and Southern
preferences become more alike, then, the free-riding motive of the South
exerts a growing influence. But when Southern preferences for technology
differ substantially from those of the North, the globally optimal ficould
well exceed a.
While the theoretical possibilities are unconstrained, numerical
simulations with the specifications described above yield the result that as $
isincreased, the optimal level of Northern protection consistently rises
while Southern protection falls. These results are diplayed in Table 1. With
sufficiently large ,theglobal planner would allow the South to have a
complete free ride.
9. There is of course nothing here that would stop $fromturning negative.
A planner who values the South's welfare sufficiently will in this case try to
enrich that region by engineering reverse profit transfers from the North,
while raising a to offset the adverse incentives on Northern R&D. It may be
natural to think of fiasbeing bound below by 0.-19-
Therefore, when the global planner places more weight on the welfare of
the South, there is no longer any reason to equate a and .But,unlike what
may have been expected, there is no general reason to let the South provide
lower levels of patent protection either. The planner has to trade off the
free-riding benefits to the South against the losses arising from reduced
levels of investment in technologies that are particularly appropriate to poor
countries.
V. The Nash Equilibrium
In the enviroment described above, patent protection in each block
affects welfare in the other block. The questions we pose next are: What
sort of patent laws emerge in the North and in the South if each region reacts
to the other region's patent laws by optimizing over the level of patent
protection in its own market? How is this equilibrium affected by the size
and the taste preferences of the South? And how does it compare with the
Pareto-optimal patent protection administered by a benevolent dictator? To
answer these questions, we first develop the players' reaction functions under
the assumption of Nash behavior.
(i) The Northern reaction function. The Northern planner choses a to
maximize social welfare (7), taking fiasgiven. Optimally, the marginal cost
of protection is set equal to the marginal benefit. We differentiate (7) with





where we have introduced the following notation: —d9/da, —dJda,
etc. The second term of (23) represents the positive marginal cost of
increased protection, an expression that is proportional to the size of the
innovation range [9-j and to the positive effect of a on the range-20-
The first term represents the net marginal benefit that accrues on both sides
of the range, and it is only (1-a) times the marginal consumer surplus (the
term in brackets) because a proportion a of the increase in consumer surplus
is dissipated in research costs by the marginal innovating firms. (Remember
that zero-profit conditions hold at the edges of the range.) The marginal
gain in consumer surplus due to an expansion of the range of innovations is
composed of two effects: the lower range necessarily expands (to the left)
after an increase in a, thus increasing welfare. The upper range generally
also expands (to the right) as fins can spread their cost on a larger base.
But, as discussed in section III, because costs increase with the range of
innovations, it is possible that the upper range retracts (to the left).
Let a* stand for the North's optimal patent. When costs are not rising
(c'—O), (23) is always positive for ccl, implying that a*_l. This would be
the case where there are no congestion effects in R&D. But with costs
increasing with the range of research activity, a*<1 since at a—l, the
expression in (23) is negative. Moreover, when $—0, a* is strictly positive,
since at a—0, .—9 and the second term of (23) is zero while the first is
positive.
How does the North react to an increase in protection in the South? In
general, but not always, the North will reduce protection in response, due to
two considerations: (i) at the margin the positive effect of Northern
protection on own welfare is attenuated, and (ii) research costs are increased
as a result of higher fi. The ambiguity noted above with respect to the signs
of and ifl' however, imply that effect (i) does not always obtain, such
that a decrease in a is sometimes desirable. To see that, apply the




where the denominator W is negative by the second order condition. Hence,
the slope of the reaction function in (24) has the same sign as the numerator
W. In order to evaluate the sign of W, we dropthe terms corresponding
to second derivatives of .andlO on the assumption that these are likely
to be of second-order importance. W is then given by:
(25) W —(l-a)[B'(8)9a9
-B'(L)4] -
where the first term captures effect (i) and the second captures effect (ii)
mentioned above. Expression (25) is negative in general, and positive only
when is negative and large and/or ipispositive and large.
The interpretation is as follows. In general, as the range of
innovations widens, the marginal benefit of innovation drops on both sides of
the range, discouraging protection. In this case, both this effect and the
rising R&D costs contribute to a lessening of Northern protection. Butwhen
tastes are very different and a and are far apart, increased Southern
protection can enhance marginal benefits of an increase in a.This can occur
in two types of situations: when and large, an increase inshifts the
range away from Northern preferences andincreased Northern protection can
increase marginal revenue by recapturing the valuable technologiesthat would
be lost otherwise. And when 9<O and large enough, a reduction in ahurts the
North by leading to the substitution of too many less valuableinnovations on
the upper side of the range. In these cases, the positiveeffect on marginal
revenue can overtake the negative effect on marginal costsand it is possible
that an increase in will be met with an increase ina as the North attempts
10. In other words we assume 7aa afl0. This is somewhat
analogous to the assumption of linear demand curvesin standard oligopoly
theory. We maintain this assumption throughoutthe paper.-22-
to shift the range of technologies away from Southern preferences.
The more general case is clearest when North-South tastes coincide (i.e
S—.O). In this case, it is possible to show (see the appendix) that the
Northern reaction function becomes linear in Southern protection and that it
is unambiguously downard sloping. In particular, we get:
(26) da*/d —- 1/7< 0 (at S-0).
(ii) The Southern reaction function. Similarly, we can derive the first-
order condition for the Southern planner and the reaction function with
respect to Northern protection. The problem is quite similar to the Northern
problem, with the difference that the cost of increased protection is an
increased transfer to foreigners rather than an increased cost of research.
Differentiating (8) with respect to fiandsetting to zero, we have (assuming






Thesecond term represents the marginal cost of increased protection in terms
of higher payments to the innovating foreign firms. If there were no
offsetting positive effect to Southern patent protection, fl'wouldof course
be optimally set to its lowest possible level as the South would simply free
ride on Northern innovations. However, there are in general gains associated
with protection and they are represented by the first term in equation (27).
An increase inincreases the range of innovations and tilts it towards
Southern tastes.'1 Note that the first term gets smaller with $,sinceonly
11. The degree to which it does that depends, of course, in part on the
relative size of the Southern market, (see section III).-23-
(1-fl) of the consumer surplus is captured by the South. In particular, the
marginal benefit of protection is zero at fl—i and therefore, fl* is necessarily
smaller than 1. Finally, note that fl can be zero in general but that it is
certainly positive when a—C.(This is because >0,when a —— 0.)
The slope of the Southern reaction function is given by:
(28) dfl*/da
-/W
which- -because the denominator is negative- -has the same sign as the






which is negative when a>O and/or .Q.fl<O. However, (29) could be positive and
it might be in the interests of the the South to react to stiffer Northern
protection by increasing its own protection. This would occur when: (j)
increased Northern protection shifts the range of innovations sufficiently
away from Southern tastes (7a.(O and large); and when (ii) at the margin, a
reduction in Southern protection would add on too many innovations on the
less-valuable lower end of the range (Lp)'O and large). Both situations are
more likely to occur when North-South preferences are quite different. Again
it is possible to show that with similar tastes (S—C):
(30) dfl*/da —- 'y<0(at S—0).
(See the appendix.)
(iii) Comvarative statics. When the Nash game described above is played,
several types of equilibria may emerge, with both reaction functions sloping-24-
down, one of the reaction functions sloping up, or even both reaction
functions sloping up. Here we will focus on small changes around equilibria
in which both reaction functions slope down, presumably the case that best
describes the current situation. Even in this case, however, a range of
different comparative statics results are possible.
(ijia) The effect of taste differences. When North-South preferences get
closer, both regions react by altering their levels of protection. There are
several effects at play here and the global effect of a change in tastes
cannot be completely determined. In order to describe the channels through
which relative preferences affect the final outcome, use the implicit function
theorem on (23) and (27) to get:
* n n (31) 3m /ØS —- WaS/
(32) 3fl*/35
-W/W.
These determine the direction of shifts in the respective reaction functions.
In both eqations, the expressions have the same sign as their numerators since
the denominators are negative when the second-order conditions of the







Let us first consider the effects of taste differences on Southern
optimal protection. As North-South preferences get closer (i.e. S decreases),
the South is affected through two channels, both of which generally discourage
patent protection. (i) First, for a given level of protection, what must be-25-
paid to the foreign innovators increases as S decreases. This marginal cost
effect ia captured by the second term in (34): since protection becomes in a
sense more expensive, there are incentives to decrease it. In effect, as the
South becomes more similar to the North, its tax base becomes larger because
the existing technologies- -which are biased towards Northern tastes- -now
produce a higher consumer surplusJ2 (ii) Second, the marginal benefit of
innovations at the ends of the range generally decrease. This is captured by
the positive sign of the first term in (34). To see why, first remember that
the range of innovations gets smaller, and that it shifts to the left by less
than the shift in Southern preferences because the reduction in research costs
associated with the smaller range forces the marginal firms (at the ends of
the range) to service thinner markets. As a result, marginal welfare gets
smaller at 7, and higher at L. Since in general the first effect dominates,
the Southern reaction function will tend to shift to the left as S is reduced.
As tastes get closer, the North is also affected through two channels.
(i) First, the range of innovations necessarily shrinks, reducing the fixed
cost of innovation for all technologies. This effect--captured by the second
term in (33)--encourages the North to increase innovation in its most prefered
technologies and this is achieved with higher protection.(ii) The other
effect- -represented by the first term in brackets- -captures the change in
marginal welfare at the ends of the innovation range, and on net exerts a
depressing effect on domestic patent protection: the lower end of the range
12. To illustrate that, imagine that India and Brazil have similar rates of
patent protection, but that Brazilian technological needs are closer to those
of the North than is the case for India. Then the above considerations state
that, given Northern influences on the existing range of technologies, a
representative consumer in Brazil would have a larger consumer surplus and
would be paying larger royalties to foreign firms.-26-
widens (.decreases)allowing the North to capture new technologies that are
less valuable at the margin. This reduces the need for patent protection as,
in effect, the marginal productivity of protection falls. On the other hand,
the upper end of the range retracts, increasing the marginal benefits atl3
This effect tends to encourage increased protection, but it is in general
smaller than the depressing effect at the lower end of the innovation range
(unless e5 is much larger than ts In sum, both the marginal cost and the
marginal benefit of protection are reduced and the reaction of the North will
depend on the relative importance of these effects.
Figure 2 illustrates the possible outcomes when Sincreases)4 As North-
South preferences get further apart, the Southern reaction function shifts up
while the Northern reaction function can either increase or decrease. The new
equilibrium is either at a point like B or C, with higher fibutambiguous
results in the North, or at a point like D with higher a but lower fi.The
only general conclusion that can be drawn when both reaction functions are
downward sloping is that at least one of the two regions must increase its
protection when S gets larger. (Conversely, either a or fimustfall when S
gets smaller.) In our simulations we find that fiisgenerally increased while
a is fairly insensitive (decreasing slightly at first, but then increasing) as
S becomes larger (see Table 2). Table 2 also diplays the possibility that the
South may choose higher levels of protection than the North if the taste
differences become pronounced enough (and the Northern reaction function
becomes positively sloped).
(iiib) Changes in relative market size. A change in the relative size of
13. Note that this effect goes the other way when <0.
14.This is drawn for the stable case where the South's reaction function is
more steeply sloped than the North's.-27-
the Southern market also has ambiguous effects on the equilibrium strategies
when both reaction functions slope down. It is easy to verify that in that
case
äa*/37- W/W=- /1W<0,





In words, the reactions functions of both regions shift back when increases.
Hence, the level of patent protection must decline in at least one of the two
regions. This implies that, somewhat paradoxically, an increase in the size
of the South can lead to reduced protection in the North and the South.
From the North's perspective, as the Southern market enlarges, the range of
innovation widens beyond the most desirable level and it may make sense to
reduce (costly) protection. But the South may have been expected to always
increase ,asthe costs of free riding now apparently become larger. This is
not so because an increase in 1 also increases the benefits of free riding, as
the profit transfers at the margin increase commensurately--see the South's
first-order condition (27). Moreover, since -y and are substitutes for each
other in determining the technology range, it may be rational for the South to
use the extra leverage provided by the increase in its marketsize to reduce
profit transfers to the North (via a reduction in ).
Table3 shows some simulation outcomes for the benchmark case. These are
generally in line with conventional wisdom. As visreduced, the South
progressively reduces fi,andeventually stops protection al,ogether.
(iv) The inefficiency of the Nash eouilibrium. We end by demonstrating
that the Nash equilibrium is inefficient from the global standpoint.This is-28-
natural, given the spillovers involved. Protection in any one region profits
the other region (when reaction functions are downward sloping). Since
neither side takes into account these spillovers, there is likely to be too
little innovation. However, other possible effects go the other way: in
particular, with a and fidifferentenough, wasteful competition sets in, and
may lead to too much protection in both blocks.
To illustrate the effects at work, we evaluate the marginal (equally-
weighted) welfare of our benevolent global dictator theNash equilibrium.









To evaluate (36) at the Nash equilibrium, we plug in (23). Then, provided that
0 (which is a sufficient but not necessary condition), the resulting





The expressions in the square brackets are positive from the zero-profit
conditions (5)-(6). Thus, the North is generally underpatented from a world
welfare point of view. The reason for that is simply that the Northern
decision makers do not take into account the positive externality that
innovations produce in the South. Note that when fl=l, (37) is equal to zero
(using [5) and [6]). Only in this limiting case is the Northern patent optimal-29-
from a global point of view.
But it may be possible for the North to be overpatented. This can occur
when a.<0 and large. In this case, there is wasteful competition in
protection as the North would be trying to shift the range of innovations
towards its most preferred technologies.
The analysis is quite similar for the South. To evaluate (35) at the Nash




which is generally positive (when >O and <O). Thus, in general, the South
is underprotected because it ignores the positive effect of protection on
Northern welfare. In particular, it is easy to verify that at S—O (38) is
unambiguously positive. However it is once again possible that the South wil1
be overprotected when 9>O and/or g.<O.
VI. Concludina Remarks
While the model analyzed here is quite simple, it leads to a rich array
of comparative-statics results, some of which may appear counter-intuitive at
first sight. This is largely due to our emphasis on the dimension of
technological choice: some of the usual free-riding considerations have to be
qualified when we take into account the possibility that patent laws in the
two regions affect not only the quantity of innovation, but also its quality.
This becomes important when the two regions have differing technological
needs. On the other hand, when the two regions are identical in preferences,
the usual conclusions can be recovered.
The analysis leads to several results, some of which can be listed as-30-
follows. First, an increase in patent protection in any of the two regions
leads to an increase in innovative activity, as well as a greater fit between
the available technologies and the preferences of the patenting region. By
implication, this skews the technology range away from the neEds of the other
region. Second, while a strictly utilitarian global welfare function would
assign identical rates of patent protection to the North and South, placing
greater weight on the welfare of the South necessitates differential
treatment. But it is not clear a orion whether the South ought to have a
lower or higher level of protection than the North. Third, when patent rules
are set in an uncoordinated manner, it is possible that a narrowing of the gap
between the technological preferences of the two regions will lead to lower
rates of patent protection in both the North and the South. Similarly, an
increase in the relative market size of the South can lead to a reduction in
patent protection in both regions.
Theoretical possibilities aside, our numerical simulations yield results
in the benchmark case that are generally in line with intuition. In
particular, we find that: (i) a benevolent global planner which places greater
weight on the South's welfare would require a higher level of patent
protection in the North; (ii) in an uncoordinated equilibrium, a reduction in
taste differences between the two regions would reduce patent protection in
the South; and (-iii) an increase in the relative market size of the South,
again in the absence of coordination, would increase Southern patents. In the
latter two cases, we find Northern patents to be generally insensitive to the
changes mentioned.-31-
APPENDIX
(a) We start by deriving the comparative statics properties of equations (5)
and (6), when the endogenous variables are 9 and .Totaldifferentiation
yields:
aB'(O) + pz(e-s) + c' -c'd




The determinant of the system, denoted by ii,isnegative.
(b) Consider next the alternative wherein a and fiaretreated as endogenous
targeted on specific 9 and ..Noticethat da/d9, for example, is not simply
the inverse of d/da as different variables are being held constant in each
case; in the first case, fiisfree to vary but j is parametric; in the latter,
Ladjustsendogenously while fiisheld fixed. The system now looks like:
-B(s)-7B(-S) da [aB'(L) + yB'(.-S) ÷ c']d -c'd
-B() -78(9-S) d$ c'd + (aB'(9) + 7'(9-S) -
Thedeterminant of the system is positive since B(9-S) > B(9) and 6(9) >
B(8-S). It can be shown therefore that (+w)(dfl/d9 + d/d) is
unambiguously positive.
(c) The second-order conditions for the Northern and the Southern
maximization problems are respectively:
(Al) Wa —(la)[B(9)O2
-B().2]





which is necessarily negative when Otherwise, it is possible that (A2)
will be positive, implying that flgoesto the corner solution fl*_O.
(d) Using (10), (11), (13) and (14), it is easy to verify that when S—0:
-;8s— — andB'(O) —-'(L). Plugging
those relationships into (25), (29), (Al) and (A2), (24) reduces to (26),
and (28) becomes (30). In general, a Nash equilibrium does not exist in this
case, as both reaction functions have the same slope.-33-
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